Decentralisation by military regimes and challenges to citizen participation: an empirical reflection from Pakistan

Since the late 1980s, there has been extensive international support for decentralised governance, expected to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of public service provision, enhance state legitimacy and stability, and reduce corruption. Decentralisation has been widely adopted across developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America to address institutional frailties and development challenges and to break up over-centralised governments. Because decentralised governance emphasizes the link between local governments and community participation, it is assumed to empower citizens and make governance more democratic and effective. Yet, states may introduce local government reforms aligned with existing authoritarian ideologies. In Pakistan, military rulers such as Generals Ayoub and Zia-ul-Haq used local governments to cloak authoritarianism. In line with prior commentary, this paper argues that local governments under non-democratic regimes alienate citizens, engender mistrust, and strengthen local elites. The article explores the dangers of decentralisation under non-democratic historical institutions in Pakistan, asking: What are the potential threats of decentralisation introduced by military regimes on public participation? Using a historical institutionalism lens, the study examines the intentions of the military establishment in using decentralisation to undermine expected benefits to citizens. The structure includes a literature review on decentralisation and participation, an exploration of how successive military regimes in Pakistan have used seemingly democratic institutions for control, and an empirical investigation set within Pakistan’s political context.

The literature posits that decentralisation, defined as meaningful devolution of central powers to local units accountable to local populations, can promote accountability and citizen participation. However, its effectiveness is highly context-dependent. In authoritarian or neo-patrimonial settings, decentralisation is often instrumentalized to project a façade of reform for donors and investors, recruit new political support, and legitimize regimes, rather than to empower citizens. Evidence from Pakistan shows local officials (nazims) aligning loyalty upwards to central military authorities, with power shifting from provinces to districts while neglecting lower tiers (union councils). Authoritarian regimes can adapt institutions to appear benign while constraining civil society, producing alienation and preventing citizens from engaging meaningfully in state affairs. A major challenge is elite capture: decentralised powers can strengthen local feudal elites, transfer social conflict locally where inequalities are sharper, and create patron-client networks that act as gatekeepers between citizens and the state, thereby exacerbating inequality. Comparative cases (Yemen, South Africa, Burundi, Indonesia) show similar patterns: predatory central authorities, entrenched corruption, and unequal social structures undermine participatory mechanisms, with citizens often resorting to protests to be heard. Fiscal decentralisation is also compromised under authoritarianism due to underdeveloped political culture, regional inequality, and weak governance; financial devolution becomes deconcentration without true autonomy. Historical institutionalism suggests that once institutions form under authoritarian logics, their path-dependent traits persist, constraining future democratizing reforms.

Research setting: The study covered urban and rural populations in Sindh province, Pakistan, selecting Larkana (urban district) and Kambar Shahdadkot (rural district) as case-study sites.

Sampling: Purposive sampling was used to capture rich, context-relevant perspectives. The effective sample comprised 70 respondents, including union councillors (n=8; six were CCB members), teachers (n=21), non-profit representatives (n=14), trade union members (n=3), local business-people (n=3), labourers (n=3), lawyers (n=2), government officials (n=2), healthcare professionals (n=2), and university students (n=6).

Data collection: An open-ended qualitative questionnaire (seven questions) was designed, translated from English into Sindhi, and distributed by trained local field assistants. Ethical approval was granted by the University of Bradford (October 2019). Recruitment used social media and local contacts; participation was voluntary with confidentiality ensured via pseudonyms. Of 150 sealed questionnaires distributed on 19 October 2019, 70 completed questionnaires were returned by 30 March 2020. Questions covered experiences during 2001–2009 local government reforms, including invitations to attend council meetings, information meetings, and other forms of citizen engagement.

Data analysis: A thematic analysis with three coding stages (open coding, second-pass coding, and selective coding) was conducted to identify recurring significant themes. Frequencies of themes were recorded to maintain analytical rigor and mitigate bias. Summary frequency tables (Tables 2 and 3 in the paper) captured the prominence of issues across responses.

Thematic analysis revealed four major categories characterizing local governments’ attitudes toward public participation in Sindh:

1. Local communities were kept at a distance from governance to maintain traditional feudal hierarchies.
2. Local elites favored their own areas and families, preventing civic involvement and fair allocation.
3. Civic knowledge and information were deliberately withheld from citizens.
4. Authorities assumed citizen participation would threaten the upper-class status quo.

Quantitative indicators from 70 responses:

• 55% (39 respondents) reported the public was kept away from participation in local development activities.
• 22% (16 respondents) reported citizens were kept in the dark—no civic education, awareness, or information on rights.
• 22% (16 respondents) reported dominant classes favored their own members/areas.
• 12% (9 respondents) perceived elites feared public exposure and empowerment.

Illustrative insights:

• Decisions were made by nazims and naib nazims without public consultation; invitations to participate were largely absent during 2001–2009 and continued under later civilian local governments (2013–2016).
• Local governments acted as mechanisms of recentralisation, aligning with military rulers and strengthening elite patronage networks.
• Poor and marginalized citizens faced exclusion from CCB processes and had limited or no access to information, reinforcing dependency and alienation.

Findings indicate that decentralisation under Pakistan’s authoritarian historical institutions served to legitimize and entrench central control, rather than to democratize governance. Consistent with historical institutionalism, military interventions constituted critical junctures that set Pakistan on a path-dependent trajectory of centralization and paternalism. Local government institutions established in this context functioned as coercive and controlling instruments, reinforcing elite gatekeeping and distancing citizens from state affairs. The camouflage of benign, participatory institutions masked coercive intent, undermining civic trust and participation. Effective decentralisation requires a democratic central state and genuine devolution; absent these, reforms are prone to elite capture, recentralisation, and increased citizen alienation.

Authoritarian regimes in Pakistan used local government reforms to retain power through centralized service delivery and to cultivate a clientele of local elites, resulting in recentralisation, weakened accountability, and diminished citizen-state interaction. To foster participatory local governance, a supportive civic culture is necessary, alongside insulation of community mechanisms (e.g., CCBs) from political interference. Recommendations include: constitutional mandating of CCBs; non-political leadership of community development departments; adequate staffing (including technical staff such as engineers); performance incentives and penalties tied to CCB promotion and fund utilization; and protecting local governments from abolition across regime changes. Future research should undertake comparative analyses across provinces and regimes to assess differential impacts of local government reforms.

The study focuses on one province (Sindh) and evaluates public participation during decentralisation reforms under successive authoritarian regimes, which limits generalizability. Time and resource constraints are acknowledged. The qualitative, open-ended questionnaire approach provides depth but not statistical representativeness. Future comparative and cross-regional studies are recommended to broaden insights.