Burning Bridges: The problem of relations in object-oriented ontology—a topological approach

The paper investigates how relations function within object-oriented ontology (OOO) and argues that OOO is inherently a topos-oriented ontology (TOO), placing place/topology at the center of objecthood. It asks how to reconcile the autonomy of objects with the necessity and status of relations in a flat ontology. The study contrasts two models of flatness—Heidegger’s interdependency (topology of Being/fourfold) and Harman’s independency (withdrawn objects)—and situates OOO within speculative realism’s post-Kantian reorganization of reality (substantivist vs topographical strategies). It proposes that what an object is is inseparable from where it is, and that acknowledging objects as places clarifies both internal and external relationality. To address the problem of external relations and destructibility, it introduces Kierkegaard’s notion of finitude and death, suggesting a topological account of death as an absolute event that foregrounds external relationality. The paper is a work in progress aiming also to pair alien phenomenology with a phenomenology of the alien within SR/OOO.

The paper surveys key strands in OOO and related speculative realism: Harman’s ontology of withdrawn, autonomous objects and vicarious causation; Bryant’s democracy of objects; Bogost’s formulation that all things equally exist yet not equally; Morton’s hyperobjects; and Gabriel’s pluralistic anti-totalization. It contrasts Harman’s independency model with Heidegger’s fourfold (interdependency) and notes Harman’s critique that Heidegger’s world-structure covertly depends on mortals. It discusses Garcia’s thesis that what and where coincide (Form and Object), Malpas’s account of place as bounded opening, and the idea that objects are places that open space (Heidegger) versus space prior to place (Bruno/Cusa). It reviews Harman’s accounts of space/time as tensions (RO–SQ for space; SO–SQ for time) and Wolfendale’s criticisms regarding spatial/proximity relations and the need for deeper space/time. It summarizes Harman’s relational taxonomy (physical, sensual, causal), the vicarious character of relations via elements, and the claim that genuine relations are themselves objects. The literature culminates in the tension between ontological equality and ontical inequality and motivates bringing Kierkegaard’s existential categories (self, finitude, death) into dialogue with OOO.

Conceptual and comparative philosophical analysis. The author performs close textual readings of OOO (primarily Harman) alongside Heidegger, Garcia, Malpas, and critiques by Wolfendale, and stages a systematic comparison with Kierkegaard’s account of the self, finitude, and death. The approach is theoretical/topological rather than empirical: it analyzes concepts such as object, relation, place, space, boundary, and death; develops principles of relationality; and examines thought-experiments and illustrative cases (e.g., embryo–womb, human–sun, spatial examples like Cairo/Osaka) to clarify distinctions between internal and external relations, ontological equality versus ontical inequality, and the destructibility of objects. The paper advances a synthetic framework reframing OOO as TOO and proposing a topological account of death.

• Objects and relations share ontological status in a flat ontology, yet a distinction emerges between ontological equality (all things equally exist) and ontical inequality (they do not exist equally), reconciling independency and interdependency at different levels.
• Objects are places: an object’s what cannot be separated from its where. Place has a dual function—sealing off (firewalls) and opening up (black noise/adjacency)—and mediates the dynamic between objecthood and relationality.
• In Harman’s system, space arises from tension between real objects (RO) and sensual qualities (SQ), and time from tension between sensual objects (SO) and SQ; however, unresolved issues remain about specific spatio-temporal structures and deeper space/time (as per Wolfendale).
• Two principles of relationality are articulated: PR1, no relation occurs between what is identical to itself; PR2, relations require two non-identical objects. Genuine relations are themselves objects (relation-substances) with withdrawal and notes.
• External relations are the central problem: while internal relationality is integral to objects, external ties can threaten or end objects given their destructibility.
• On death: OOO accommodates destructible substances; Harman offers relational, conditional (hyperobject), and gradual senses of death. Kierkegaard contributes a fourth, necessary sense: death as an absolute real event that is neither internal to the object nor merely a relation but a radical outside/no-where that makes the other senses coherent and foregrounds finitude as a boundary from which existence begins its presencing.
• The self, in Kierkegaard, fits OOO’s object-criteria (withdrawal, more-than-its-parts/relations), exhibits internal relationality (self-relation), and is essentially finite; this enriches OOO’s account of limits, place, and destructibility and supports reframing OOO as a topos-oriented ontology (TOO).

By reframing OOO through topology (TOO), the paper addresses the core question of how relations can obtain in a landscape of autonomous, withdrawn objects. Treating objects as places clarifies how internal relationality is constitutive while external relationality remains contingent and potentially destructive, thus explaining both autonomy and interaction without reinstating hierarchy. The ontological-equality/ontical-inequality distinction provides a principled way to reconcile independency (Harman) with interdependency (Heidegger) across levels. Introducing Kierkegaard’s account of finitude and death resolves ambiguities in OOO about destructibility: death must be an absolute event external to the object’s interior, which in turn illuminates the significance of external relations and boundaries. The proposal strengthens OOO by situating space, time, and limit within place, and by pairing alien phenomenology with a phenomenology of the alien to encompass both object-centered and alterity-centered perspectives.

Relations in a flat ontology have the same ontological status as objects, yet their functioning requires a topological account of place as both boundary and opening. Distinguishing ontological equality from ontical inequality allows independency and interdependency to coexist without hierarchy. Harman’s taxonomy of relations and the principles PR1 and PR2 show that relations are themselves objects, but external relations pose problems when considering destructibility. Integrating Kierkegaard’s notion of the self and finitude enriches OOO’s account of limits and death, adding to Harman’s three senses a fourth: death as an absolute real event that occurs radically outside the object. Consequently, OOO should be understood as a topos-oriented ontology (TOO), where place is foundational to objecthood, relationality, and finitude.

The work is explicitly a work in progress offering key ideas rather than a complete theory. It does not provide an exhaustive treatment of temporality; questions remain about the precise spatial character of real-object interiors versus interaction spaces and whether deeper space/time underwrite OOO’s derived space/time. The account of death as an absolute event is programmatic and requires further development, as does a full theory of destructibility across object domains. Empirical or formal models of spatio-temporal relations (e.g., proximity metrics) are not provided.