PsychologyPhilosophers' Imprint
Being Rational and Being Wrong
K. Dorst
Many take mismatches between confidence and accuracy to show irrational overconfidence. This paper asks when that inference is warranted, introduces the notion of deference to connect rationality and being right, and shows rational agents can often be miscalibrated—so calibration tests must predict rational deviations before judging overconfidence. This research was conducted by Kevin Dorst.
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