The article begins by differentiating between authority (the right to command and merit compliance through moral obligation) and power (the ability to enforce commands through coercion). It uses the example of a robber holding someone at gunpoint to illustrate the distinction: the robber has power but not legitimate authority. The core conflict explored is between individual autonomy and the authority of the state to enact and enforce laws. The concept of 'public reason' is introduced, defined as the requirement for political laws to possess at least some justification. The paper contrasts two traditional justifications for political laws: natural law theory (justifying laws through moral duty) and legal positivism (justifying laws through legal duty). The author aims to synthesize these two perspectives to provide a more comprehensive justification for political laws, referencing Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and Rousseau's *On the Social Contract*.

The author draws upon the work of several prominent thinkers in political philosophy. Immanuel Kant's concept of categorical imperatives (CIs) is central, representing moral duties derived from pure practical reason. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concept of the General Will (GW) is also crucial, representing the collective will of the people aimed at the common good. The author integrates the perspectives of H.L.A. Hart (contemporary legal positivism) and John Rawls (public reason), showing how their ideas complement the Kantian and Rousseauvian frameworks. Thomas Aquinas's distinction between natural and human laws, and Thomas Hobbes's emphasis on the social contract for maintaining peace and order, are also referenced. The author also cites various scholars who have discussed Rousseau's General Will and its relation to both legal positivism and natural law theory.

The paper employs a primarily philosophical methodology, analyzing and synthesizing existing theories from Kantian ethics, Rousseauvian social contract theory, and contemporary legal positivism. The author uses logical reasoning, conceptual analysis, and thought experiments to examine the legitimacy of political laws based on different moral and legal grounds. The analysis starts with Kant's categorical imperatives (CIs), distinguishing between CIs (absolute moral commands) and hypothetical imperatives (HIs, conditional commands based on means-ends reasoning). The author argues that only laws based on CIs have absolute moral authority, while laws based on HIs are more problematic. Unanimous direct democracy is presented as a theoretical solution to the conflict between authority and autonomy concerning laws based on HIs, but its impracticality leads to the examination of Rousseau's General Will. The author explores the General Will's characteristics, demonstrating how it shares elements of both natural law theory and legal positivism, functioning as both a secondary rule (legislative procedure) and an ultimate rule of recognition (moral scrutiny). The analysis examines the feasibility of direct democracy, considering technological advancements that might facilitate its implementation. Condorcet's theorem is introduced to assess the possibility of the General Will reliably identifying the common good through majority rule, acknowledging the underlying assumptions needed for its validity.

The paper's key findings revolve around the strengths and limitations of different approaches to justifying political laws. It demonstrates that Kantian CIs can justify a limited subset of political laws (those based on perfect moral duties), but they are insufficient to justify most laws. Laws based on HIs (the vast majority of political laws) create a tension between individual autonomy and state authority because they depend on contingent desires and empirical outcomes. The author introduces Rousseau's General Will (GW) as a potential solution, highlighting its dual nature: a democratic process (legal positivism) and a representation of the common good (natural law theory). However, the paper also highlights the challenges of realizing the GW in practice. Unanimous direct democracy, while theoretically resolving the conflict between autonomy and authority, is considered impractical. Majoritarian direct democracy, while more feasible, relies on the problematic Condorcet assumption (that individuals have a greater than 50% chance of judging correctly) to ensure the GW aligns with the common good. The paper concludes that while the GW offers a potential improvement over current systems, it doesn't provide a perfect solution due to inherent limitations in achieving genuine consensus and verifying the common good empirically.

The paper's findings challenge the traditional dichotomy between natural law theory and legal positivism, proposing a synthesis that recognizes the moral dimensions of even seemingly arbitrary laws. It also demonstrates the tension between individual autonomy and the need for a legitimate state authority, showing that relying solely on either Kantian or Rousseauvian principles presents challenges. The analysis of the General Will highlights the practical difficulties of achieving true democratic legitimacy, suggesting that while direct democracy offers a theoretically appealing model, it relies on strong assumptions that are difficult to guarantee in practice. The paper concludes that even imperfect models like the General Will can lead to improvements in the current political landscape, indicating a path toward a more just and morally grounded legislative process. The implications of these findings are significant for discussions on political legitimacy, democratic theory, and the relationship between law and morality.

The paper concludes that neither Kantian ethics nor Rousseau's General Will provide a perfect solution to justifying the moral ground of political laws. While Kantian categorical imperatives offer a foundation for a limited number of laws, the General Will, while potentially improving upon existing systems, relies on difficult-to-verify assumptions about human rationality and the ability to ascertain the common good. Future research could explore alternative frameworks for addressing the conflict between autonomy and authority, potentially incorporating insights from other schools of thought in political philosophy and considering the impact of technological developments on democratic processes.

The study is primarily a philosophical analysis, and therefore lacks empirical evidence to support its claims. The feasibility of implementing a system based on the General Will in large, diverse societies is not fully addressed, and the potential for manipulation or tyranny of the majority remains a concern. The paper acknowledges that the assumptions underlying Condorcet's theorem are strong and difficult to verify in practice. The focus on specific philosophical theories might neglect other relevant considerations in the complex realm of law and politics. The paper itself acknowledges the inherent difficulties in definitively resolving the conflict between individual autonomy and legitimate state authority.